

## Message Text

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73-60

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 131681

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM

E. O. 11652: XGDS 5 B(1)(2)

TAGS: CB, PINT, PFOR

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: THE PRICE OF NEGOTIATIONS

PARIS FOR JEC

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INR ANALYSIS.

1. WITH US AIR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA SCHEDULED TO END ON AUGUST 15, THE KHMER INSURGENTS APPARENTLY FEEL NO URGENCY ABOUT ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR THE PRESENT PHNOM PENH GOVERNMENT. EVEN IF US AIR SUPPORT SHOULD SOMEHOW BE MADE AVAILABLE AFTER AUGUST 15, MAJOR CONCESSIONS WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO INDUCE  
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THE INSURGENTS TO NEGOTIATE AND TO ACHIEVE A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT. HANOI, PEKING, AND MOSCOW MAY BE WILLING TO URGE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE INSURGENTS BUT IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEY WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THEM TO ACCEPT LESS AT

A CONFERENCE TABLE THAN THE INSURGENTS NOW EXPECT TO ACHIEVE BY FORCE OF ARMS.

2. THE INSURGENTS' POSITION OF STRENGTH. MILITARILY, THE INSURGENTS HOLD THE INITIATIVE, WITH ALMOST NO CHANCE THAT THE KHMER ARMED FORCES ( FANK) WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST THEIR EFFORTS OR TO PERMANENTLY DETER THEIR ADVANCES. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY THEY ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO ATTEMPT TO

CAPTURE PHNOM PENH, INSURGENT FORCES CAN CUT LINES OF COMMUNICATION INTO THE CAPITAL AT WILL AND ARE PUSHING THE SAFE PERIMETER CLOSER AND CLOSER TO THE CITY ITSELF. THE RAINY SEASON WILL HINDER INSURGENT SKIRMISHING VERY LITTLE, THEREFORE AFFORDING LITTLE RESPITE FOR THE FANK, WHICH, WITHOUT US AIR SUPPORT, WILL BE EVEN MORE VULNERABLE.

3. THE VIEW FROM HANOI, PEKING AND MOSCOW. HANOI MIGHT AGREE THAT THE KHMER INSURGENTS SHOULD TEST THEIR MILITARY OPPORTUNITIES FURTHER BEFORE EMBARKING ON NEGOTIATIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PROBABLY DO NOT SEE MUCH RISK THAT CONTINUED HOSTILITIES IN CAMBODIA WILL SUBJECT NORTH VIETNAM TO AMERICAN RETALIATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HANOI MIGHT FEEL THAT IT HAS LITTLE TO LOSE BY ENCOURAGING NEGOTIATIONS. IT ALREADY HAS AND CAN MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT ACCESS TO EASTERN CAMBODIA TO SERVE ITS PURPOSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT MIGHT ALSO BE MOTIVATED TO EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE BY CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM ITS OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE US.

4. PEKING ALSO, BECAUSE OF ITS MAJOR INTEREST IN DETENTE WITH THE US, MIGHT URGE THE GRUNK TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS. A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT RATHER THAN A MILITARY SOLUTION MIGHT SEEM TO BE THE BEST MEANS OF CASHING IN ON THE HEAVY CHINESE INVESTMENT IN SIHANOUK, SINCE HIS ROLE IN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD PROBABLY BE A CONSPICUOUS  
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ONE FROM WHICH HE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO EMERGE WITH A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN PHNOM PENH.

5. HOWEVER, EVEN IF HANOI AND PEKING SAW SOME ADVANTAGE IN PRESSING THE KHMER INSURGENTS TO SEEK MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, THEY MIGHT BE UNWILLING TO EXERT THE NECESSARY PRESSURE TO FORCE THE INSURGENTS TO DROP THEIR MAJOR DEMANDS. SIHANOUK, HAVING RENEWED HIS PRESTIGE WITH THE THIRD WORLD, IS NOW IN A POSITION WHERE HE MIGHT PUBLICLY RESIST SUCH PRESSURES, TO THE POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT OF PEKING OR HANOI. AND THE INSURGENTS COULD PROBABLY KEEP UP AN EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES FOR SOME TIME AFTER A US BOMBING HALT, EVEN IF HANOI WERE TO CUT OFF SUPPLIES.

6. MOSCOW APPEARS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN PEKING AND HANOI TO PRESS THE INSURGENTS INTO A COURSE UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. IT HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE WITH THE INSURGENTS, SINCE IT HAS PROVIDED THEM LITTLE, IF ANY, MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND SINCE IT RECOGNIZES THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN PHNOM PENH. HOW-

EVER, RECENT EFFORTS BY SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN PHNOM PENH SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW MAY BE SEEKING TO PLAY A MIDDLEMAN ROLE IN GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. IT MAY THUS HOPE TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN CONTINUED RELATIONS WITH WHAT IT NOW SEES AS A MORIBUND REGIME AND TO GAIN SOME INFLUENCE OVER A POST-HOSTILITIES GOVERNMENT.

7. INSURGENTS WILL DRIVE A HARD BARGAIN. THE INSURGENTS HAVE REASON TO FEEL THAT THEY CAN WIN MILITARILY, WHETHER OR NOT US BOMBING IS HALTED. IN VIEW OF THE SCHEDULED AUGUST 15 CESSATION OF US AIR OPERATIONS, THEIR PRICE FOR ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT WILL BE HIGH. SIHANOUK AND OTHER GRUNK LEADERS REMAIN PUBLICLY ADAMANT IN THEIR REFUSAL TO SIT DOWN WITH THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN PHNOM PENH. GRUNK PRESS RELEASES CONTINUE TO ATTACK "THE LON NOL- SIRIK MATAK- SON NGOC THANH- IN TAM CLIQUE," AND SIHANOUK RECENTLY SUGGESTED THAT "THE TRAITORS" BE GIVEN ONE-WAY TRIPS OUT OF PHNOM PENH. HOWEVER, SHOULD  
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LON NOL LEAVE THE SCENE, GRUNK LEADERS MIGHT SOFTEN THEIR POSITION ON SOME OF THE OTHERS. THE INSURGENTS MIGHT BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH A GOVERNMENT INCLUDING IN TAM AND CHENG HENG. SIRIK MATAK, HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO LEAVE. SINCE THE GRUNK LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO INSIST ON US RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES, SOME US INITIATIVE WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING BEFORE THE 15 AUGUST DEADLINE.

8. ONCE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN, GRUNK WILL INSIST ON MAJOR CONCESSIONS. ANY SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE INSURGENTS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO INCLUDE A LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR SIHANOUK. BOTH PUBLIC AND CLANDESTINE REPORTING INDICATE THAT ANY RESERVATIONS THE INSURGENTS MAY HAVE ABOUT THE UNPREDICTABLE PRINCE ARE NOW SUBORDINATE TO RECOGNITION OF HIS VALUE -- INTERNALLY BECAUSE OF HIS APPEAL TO A POPULATION INCREASINGLY DISILLUSIONED WITH HIS SUCCESSORS, EXTERNALLY BECAUSE OF HIS ABILITY TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON CAMBODIA. IN ADDITION, THE INSURGENTS, WHOSE NATIONALISM IS AT LEAST AS STRONG AS THEIR IDEOLOGY, ARE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT A DE FACTO DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY, OR A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN NAME ONLY. TO BE ACCEPTABLE, ANY NEWLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO GIVE THE INSURGENTS A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF POWER IN PHNOM PENH,

IF NOT OUTRIGHT DOMINATION. THE PRESENCE OF SIHANOUK WILL  
NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. THE INSURGENTS  
HAVE PLANS AND PROGRAMS OF THEIR OWN FOR WHICH THEY HAVE

BEEN FIGHTING, AND THEY WILL DEMAND SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE  
IN A NEW GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THEM. RUSH

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